Essays in Systematic Theology
2 of the present article is to identify the principal issues to be addressed in interpreting these two manuscripts and in relating the two versions of the chapter both to one another and to wider theological concerns. The principal issues will be stated later in this section, as will a hypothesis regarding the relation between the two versions. In sections 2 and 3 I will develop very briefly the hypothesis about the relations between the two versions. In section 4 I begin to comment on Lonergan's text itself, focusing on the brief Prooemium or Preface to the pars systematica in order to identify Lonergan's principal convictions about systematics and to relate his efforts to other concerns in theology today. In particular, I use the issue of theological categories, already raised in the Preface, to contrast the respective approaches to trinitarian theology of Lonergan and Hans Urs von Balthasar. And in section 5 I return to the relations between the two versions by focusing on the divisions internal to each version.
The hypothesis that will be developed briefly in the next two sections is as follows. The changes that appear when Lonergan revised the chapter for his 1964 text on the Trinity are due, I believe, primarily to a preoccupation with problems raised as he addressed himself to contemporary logic. This is a preoccupation that he did not yet have and for a shift in the treatment of history in the 1964 text. This, in its briefest form, is my hypothesis. Detailed evidence for it will be produced in further work, where I will comment on the opening sections of the chapter and propose that the changes in section 3
(the first changes introduced in Lonergan's revision) are due to these logical concerns and that these changes influence a subtle shift in the treatment of history in later sections of the chapter. from what is first with respect to us -as this notion functions in theology. These qualifications should be introduced in any commentary on Lonergan's presentation of the via analytica and the via synthetica (alternatively known as the way of discovery and the way of teaching). But that is material for another article.
The two issues that are of particular importance in the chapter in De Deo trino can be used to divide the chapter into two main parts. We find in the earlier sections of the chapter a thorough statement (probably the most complete statement in the Lonergan corpus) of the position that the function of systematics is to understand mysteries of faith that have already been affirmed. But it is clear in later sections of the chapter that am suggesting, in the fact that Lonergan is intent in the later version on incorporating into his understanding of the principal function of systematics the fruit of his attempts to relate his cognitional theory to a set of logical ideals. This objective takes precedence in the revised version to the possibility of pursuing the suggestive comments of the earlier version regarding the relation of system and history. In fact, some of these comments are dropped, and others are given an attenuated significance. A logical concern appears especially in section 3 of the revised version of the chapter. This concern is not evident in the earlier version, and it affects the changes that are made in presenting the issue of system and history in the later sections of the chapter. This is my hypothesis.
Expansion of the Hypothesis
Let me expand a bit on the hypothesis. 
Significance of the Issue for Understanding Lonergan's Development
Understanding the changes that Lonergan made in this chapter is important for grasping his development during these crucial years. The issues that he addresses in the chapter engaged his committed attention. They were at the heart of his concerns as he moved to the developed position on method. And in fact, the chapter itself may very well be more important than we might tend to think if we limit our attention to Method in Theology. what it does, but also, I would wager, perhaps the most thorough explanation of this particular option to be found anywhere. It is true that Lonergan says that the entire chapter presents simply a few short notes (notulas) regarding the method of systematic or speculative theology, that is, regarding the end or goal that it intends, the act by which it attains that goal, and the movement of proceeding to that act. It is true that he calls the treatment schematic, and that his intention is not to set forth a complete treatise on method, but to offer a few notes that regard only the question of speculation in theology, the quaestio speculativa. It is true that the point of this exposition is to forestall difficulties that can arise in the study of any science when it is not clear what goal is being intended and how one is to move to that goal. But it is also true that one will search long and hard and, I believe, in vain to find a more elaborate or clearer statement of the precise option here taken on the method and function of systematic theology.
The option, moreover, is the one that Lonergan maintains was taken by Aquinas after centuries of 'a heavy overlay of conceptualism.' 8 Recovering Thomas's views on understanding was a fundamental concern for Lonergan in his work on verbum in Aquinas, 9 and not least among his reasons for that study was the renewal of systematic theology in the tradition of Aquinas.
However, issues have arisen in the contemporary context that did not and indeed could not explicitly concern Aquinas. Lonergan is attempting to address these issues, and the attempt lies behind the changes that were made in the chapter between 1957 and 1964. He was convinced not only that these issues have to be faced, but also that facing them is the only way in which we can do for theology 
System and History
A somewhat fuller presentation of the respective treatments of the issue of 'system and history' in the two versions of this chapter will serve to clarify the hypothesis. There is at least a twofold difference in the treatment of this issue in the two texts. But there is a second and related difference. In the earlier version there is a threefold movement to the act by which the theological goal is reached: analytic, synthetic, and historical. In the later version the movement is twofold. The terms used are 'dogmatic' and 'systematic,' and these terms replace, respectively, the earlier terms 'analytic' and 'synthetic.' The historical component is no longer considered to be strictly 10 See Divinarum personarum 19. 11 theological. It is now considered to be prior to the strictly theological movements of dogmatics and systematics. The 'history' that Lonergan refers to here is the lived history of dogma and theology, a history that is written about. The methodological treatment of this historical movement in the two versions is almost identical, and it is easy to overlook the fact that a different place is assigned to the movement itself, in its lived reality, in relation to the theological dimensions that first were called 'analytic' and 'synthetic' and later 'dogmatic' and 'systematic.' In the earlier version the history of dogma and theology is part of the theological movement to theological acts, 11 and understanding that history has something of the same theological import as the work of doctrines and systematics themselves. But in the later version this history and our understanding of it are prior to 'theology' strictly so called.
In attempting to understand these moves, we must recall that 'theology' is still narrowly conceived, prior to the notion of functional specialization, and that the placing of history outside theology in the strict sense will be reversed again under the broader and more inclusive notion of theology that appears in Method in Theology. But my present point is different. In both versions Lonergan is inching toward relating to one another in genetic and dialectical fashion the movements, positions, and systems that can be discovered in the history of theology itself, but in the earlier version he is presenting such explanatory history as something of a theology of Christian theologies. In other words, there is more of a suggestion of a 'history that is written' that would be an explanatory account of a 'history that is written about. Not only is the relation of explanatory history to systematics different in the respective treatments of 1957/1959 and 1964 , in that in the early version such history is regarded as theological whereas in the later version it is placed prior to theology in the strict sense of the term; but also the same question remains even for students of Method in Theology.
Note that I am not asking about just any 'history that is written,' or even about just any 'critical history that is written,' but about one that claims to be explanatory and so in some sense systematic or synthetic. For there is a 'history that is written' that constitutes what later for Lonergan will be the third functional specialty, a specialty that is part of theology's first phase, the phase that mediates through indirect discourse from the past into the present. But that 'history that is written' does not at least in principle claim to be explanatory. There is nothing forbidding it to be explanatory, of course, but as Lonergan presents the third functional specialty it is sufficient that it be narrative and descriptive. It need not achieve an understanding of the past in which the movements of the past are related to one another in dialectical and genetic fashion. Whether it reaches some degree of explanation or not, it is theological, in the broader sense of 'theology' that emerges with functional specialization. But if Lonergan's work does make possible an explanatory history of intellectual movements, what is the relation of such 'history that is written' to systematics? Where will it be put forth within the complete 'set of sets' of theological operations constituted by functional specialization? Clearly, this is a distinct question, but it does arise now that we see something of the complex development of the issues in Lonergan's own mind. Dialectic moves toward an explanatory position on the history of dogma, doctrine, and theology, but where does that position itself, once achieved (however hypothetically), itself belong? Suppose the theological community were to achieve, in whole or in part, a concrete but explanatory 13 theology of theologies. Where would that theology be located in the scheme of the functional specialties? The seeds of such a question are already planted, I believe, in the text under investigation, and especially in its earlier version.
As with the first indication of a difference between the two versions, so here, we encounter a theme that keeps arising in Lonergan's thinking without his ever seeming to take a definitive position in its regard. In fact, I will argue, the two differences that I 
Preface
The hypothesis has been stated. With it in mind, I wish to comment briefly on the Preface to the whole of the pars systematica. Systematics, it can be found at pp. 2-5. Christi a very helpful example is given of the so-called 'hinge point' between these two movements.
17
Lonergan was treating these issues. 17 But for Lonergan some of the conclusions that can be drawn in this way have to be presupposed at the very beginning of doing what in fact the Council was proposing, and so at the very beginning of a systematic ordering.
Conclusions from scripture and dogma precede the intelligentia fidei that was the Council's meaning. They often render such understanding possible, but in themselves they do not constitute theological understanding. After one has drawn such conclusions, the entire task of systematic theology still remains to be done. 
General Categories
Again Moreover, while such analogies can be helpful, they can also be problematic. The importance of the general categories, however, is not only methodological, and the issue of the categories is more complex than just their relevance to mediation.
There is also a theological significance, and the analogies of nature are only part of the theological function of the general categories. A methodical employment of general categories places a theology in a tradition that, broadly speaking, is Aristotelian-Thomist, and distinguishes a theology from a tradition that is too narrowly Augustinian and 
The Sections
In the introductory paragraph to chapter 1 of the Pars systematica, Lonergan indicates that the point of the chapter is simply to present the methodological considerations, the considerations of end and means, that will enable the reader to steer clearly along the path to the goal of synthetic, systematic understanding, or more precisely to the act by which that goal is attained. 26 The difficulties that attend any scientific investigation when such stress that the movements that Lonergan is discussing in each text are movements to the act of understanding by which we achieve some imperfect and analogical insight into the mysteries of faith. The difference in meaning may seem slight, since the goal is understanding, and the act by which the goal is achieved is a particular kind of act of understanding. But I think it does help us to read the chapter more carefully if we think of the movements quite precisely as movements toward an act.
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While the treatment would be subsumed into functional specialization, the concern remained the same.
My present concern, however, remains the first chapter of the systematic treatment of the Trinity. I have stated a hypothesis about the relation between the two versions of the chapter. Comments on the Preface have indicated resources for reflection on Lonergan's development and on the significance of his emphases. Here I want to comment on the divisions internal to each version. Even these divisions provide materials for the question, What precisely is going forward in Lonergan's own development at this time?
The 1964 edition of the chapter has ten sections. The earlier version has nine.
The section titles of the two editions are as follows, with the page numbers on which the respective sections begin. Comparison of the analytic and synthetic movements; 6 There is added a consideration of a third, historical movement; 7 Further consideration of the historical movement; 8
The object of theology; 9 The intention of this short work.
1964: 1 The goal; 2 The act by which the goal is attained; 3 Question or problem;
4 The truth of the understanding; 5 The twofold movement toward the goal; 6
Comparison of the dogmatic way and the systematic way; 7 There is added a consideration of a historical movement; 8 Further consideration of the historical movement; 9 The object of theology; 10 The intention of this short work. strictly theological. In one sense, this foreshadows the developments that will be finalized in the notion of functional specialization, where history is in a quite distinct phase of theology from doctrines and systematics. In another sense, however, there is a major difference from that later conception, in that, by the time Lonergan has come to the notion of functional specialization, the distinct phase to which history belongs will be acknowledged to be theological, not prior to theology.
But we must ask whether in another sense something was lost, and if so, whether it was ever regained: namely, the intimate concern of the doctrinal and systematic dimensions of theology with historical process precisely as an issue for doctrines and systematics. Again, we could put this concern in another way: Has Lonergan dropped the idea of a new kind of synthesis, one based on positive research itself, that he entertained in the earlier version? This concern, which appeared so briefly in 1957 and again in 1959, was not regained in any of Lonergan's published work on systematics. Obviously, it is central to his thought as a whole, but its synthetic and so systematic character is still not brought into the light as much as it might be. Undoubtedly functional specialization permits the more concrete approach to theology that Lonergan anticipates in 1957, but the synthetic quality of that more concrete theology, a quality that Lonergan said in 1957 had not yet appeared, remains fairly hidden unless we can offer developments regarding the functional specialty 'systematics' itself.
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On the other hand, the concern for the relation of system and history does continue to appear in other places. We will see it, for example, in the notes for the course What is going forward here? The issue is complex. I have tried to raise the issue, point to its complexity, and state a hypothesis in its regard (sections 2 and 3). I have also commented on the overall aim of systematics for Lonergan and on the types of categories that must be employed to meet that aim (section 4), and shown, I hope, how even the divisions internal to the chapter under investigation raise the questions that the hypothesis attempts to answer at least in part (section 5). I hope this chapter has helped to focus some questions both about Lonergan's development and about systematics itself. I hope too that in subsequent contributions I can return to this same very rich chapter in Lonergan's writings.
